A History of the Concept of the Person from Greek Antiquity to Early Modern Times

(1.) The ancient Greeks did not have one word that would apply to all creatures that were understood as a someone (e.g. to human beings, gods and mythological figures such as sirens, centaurs, nymphs, cyclops etc.). Hence they did not have a concept of a person.

(2.) The Roman's operated with the category of a person in various contexts: the Latin term 'persona' was commonly used in reference to a theatrical mask, a character in a tragedy or comedy, a grammatical person (ego, tu, nos, vos etc.), a social role  (examples to be found in Cicero, Seneca), a legal status (part of the Roman Law was dedicated to that which pertains to persons - quod ad personas pertinet). Finally, Cicero's De officiis refers 'persona' to all men who are in possession of reason.

(3.) The undeviating context for all the debates over the concept of a person in ancient patristic thought is theological, in particular, it pertains to Trinitarian and Christological dogmas. This contexts remains the most significant for the discussion of the concept of a person throughout Late Ancient and Medieval Times in the Greek East and Latin West.

(4.) Due to this context, all patristic theories of a person (e.g. that of Hilary of Poitiers, Augustine of Hippo, the Cappadocian Fathers) assume a relational understanding of a person, i.e. the understanding of a person as a kind of a relation within the Trinity.

(5.) The definition of a person formulated by Boethius in the VIth century in the context of the Christological debate in the treatise 'Contra Eutychen et Nestorium' comprises the first fully substantial understanding of a person, i.e. the understanding derived solely from the concepts of nature and substance without any explicit reference to the relational character of persons.

(6.) Up until the XII century Boethius’ definition, interpreted as fully reconcilable with other relational Trinitarian models (also the one known from different than Contra Eutychen theological works of Boethius) has been widely and uncritically accepted.

(7.) In the second half of the XII century in the treatise De Trinitate Richard of Saint Victor criticized Boethius’ definition, arguing that it pertains to the Trinity as such, not just to the three divine persons, and in the light of this criticism formulated his own, original, relational definition of a person based on the concepts of existence rather than substance, incommunicability rather than individuality and rationality, at times replaced by the broader term ‘intellectuality’.

(8.) Since the publication of Richard’s De Trinitate in the late XII century and in the XIII century all influential conceptions of a person (e.g. Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, Bonaventure, John Duns Scotus, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent) referred explicitly or implicitly to both Richard’s formulation and his criticism on Boethius. The listed philosophers followed a conciliatory strategy that was popular in Medieval Times and thus assumed reconcilability of Richard’s and Boethius’ treatises.

(9.) Concurrently, late XII and the XIII century brought advanced developments in the reflection upon the problem of a relation: in logical, metaphysical and theological contexts. In particular, the XIII century high scholasticism is marked by the occurrence of manifold typologies of names concerning the Trinitarian model (nomina naturalia – nomina personalia – nomina appropriata).

(10.) In Thomas Aquinas’ Trinitarian theology Richard’s critical argumentation against Boethius is visibly accepted (ST I, q. 29, a. 3) and implications are drawn from it, resulting in Aquinas’ decision to use Boethius’ definition in the context of a person as such and a relational definition of his own in the contexts of the divine persons (ST I, q. 29, a. 4).

(11.) During the Reformation Boethius’ definition was used by the Polish Unitarians as an argument against Trinitarians, whose line of reasoning appealed to Richard’s authority as well as his definition. The Unitarians argued in line with Richard’s criticism of Boethius, that Boethius’ definitions concerns Trinity as such, rather than Father, Son or Spirit. Their opponents recalled Richard’s authority, his criticism of Boethius and his relational definition.

 

The role of Richard of St. Victor’s conception is profound in the above described alterations of the diachronic development of the theories of a person in Medieval Times and early modernity: firstly, it played a key role in strengthening the relational descriptions of a person, secondly, it comprises a watershed in the theretofore uncritical reception of the Boethius’ substantial definition, being at the same time a catalyst for the later Unitarian interpretation of Boethius’s definition in Polish Reformation and, thirdly, it comprises a novel, original conception of personhood defined as an 'incommunicable existence of rational nature'.